General Moore is quoted. The problem is that he does not represent the end customer; the USAF. He represents the F-35 project office, where like many DOD project offices, it isn't about representing the public as a watchdog of their tax dollars. It is all about improving your career and coming in for the big win. A smaller example would be the failed EFV, presidential helicopter and Army's future combat system. What the public got to the bitter end was happy talk from the head program offices.
The fraud pushed by the F-35 program office--and now the partners in crime the USAF itself, hello RICO statute--is nothing new.
General Moore hasn't always been too good on predictions.
Lordy, lordy! I do declare! The general makes a fine casket salesman! He sure do wants you to buy that satin lining!
General Moore states this the other day at the Air Force Association gathering.
"Flight test production roll outs are helping us build confidence in this plan and the weapons system," Moore said. "Now it's just a matter of getting into a good battle rhythm in terms of production rate."
The head DOD procurement guy Ashton Carter mentioned production capability in reference to the budget. That is, the reason that the budget will only allow 30-some aircraft for the next production lot is because the aircraft design is not stable and this is about the max number of aircraft the production line can handle without making a big mess.
Until the design is stable; until there is a tremendous amount of flight testing to verify what is being built are not mistake-jets, there is no production learning curve of worth.
General Moore should have been asked why the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) meeting--which is needed to verify program worth--keeps getting delayed and, delayed again.
Until that happens, along with the disinformation from the USMC and Navy (all three services stating the importance of the F-35 within days) this program still looks like a sham. And if the DAB is pencil-whipped, we can expect to see things get worse, not better.